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n response to tightening government finances 
in the wake of structural adjustment reforms 
and other budgetary shocks in developing 
countries, the desire to design more efficient 
poverty-alleviation (or transfer) programs has 
become central. There has been a movement 
toward policy instruments that target budgets 
more efficiently to the poor. One common 
approach  to evaluating the relative efficiency of 
alternative programs has been to compare 
leakage and undercoverage rates or the closely 
related concepts of  E-mistakes and F-mistakes. 
While such indicators capture some aspects of 
the welfare impacts from better targeting, they 
also have shortcomings. For example, the under-
coverage and leakages approach focuses on the 
identity of the recipients but ignores the size and 
distribution of the budget. 
 
Organization of the Paper 
This paper sets out a simple general equilibrium 
model for the evaluation of alternative transfer 
programs (or policy instruments). Using this 
model, the authors derive the total welfare 
impact for a range of policy instruments as the 
sum of the  direct effect on welfare plus the 
indirect welfare  effect aris-
ing from the need to restore 
equilibrium in product and 
factor markets as well as to 
public finances. As is the 
case with most of the 
analyses of the distribu-
tional impact of programs, 
the paper focuses exclu-
sively on the direct welfare impact of programs. 
  The authors then derive the so-called  distri-
butional characteristic of a policy instrument as 
the welfare-weighted sum of transfers across 
households divided by the unweighted sum of 
transfers, i.e., the transfer budget. The authors 
show h ow this distributional characteristic can 
be additively decomposed into two components: 
one that captures its  targeting efficiency, the 
other, its  redistributive efficiency. Using these 
measures, they provide an interpretation of the 
commonly used leakage  and undercoverage 
rates (and other indices based on these concepts) 
within standard welfare theory. Essentially, one 
can interpret such indices as special (and 
restrictive) cases of the targeting efficiency 
index. Not only do these measures fail to 
capture the relative redistributive efficiencies of 
policy instruments, they also implicitly assume 
a set of value judgments consistent only with the 
commonly used poverty gap. 
 
Illustration of the Decomposition Using Data 
from Mexico 
The authors then apply this  technique to eval-
uate the relative targeting and redistributive 
efficiencies of alternative policy instruments 
using the recent shift in Mexico’s poverty alle-
viation strategy toward better-targeted transfer 
schemes. The point of departure is one where 
universal food (i.e., 
cereals) subsidies con-
stitute the main plank 
of the poverty allevi-
ation strategy. How-
ever, these are per-
ceived as being poorly 
targeted with much 
leakage of benefits to 
nonpoor households.  
  While a number of alternative targeting 
strategies could have been considered, the 
authors chose to evaluate two broad approaches: 
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demographic and poverty targeting. Demo-
graphic targeting involves giving transfers only 
to households with children, similar to the child 
benefit in many developed countries. Poverty 
targeting involves giving transfers only to 
households classified as poor according to 
some—usually welfare-based—criterion. The 
actual program implemented in Mexico is a 
combination of these two approaches, with an 
element of geographic targeting also involved. 
  Using the decomposition technique de-
scribed above, the authors are able to demon-
strate that the gains from switching from uni-
versal food subsidies to demographic transfers 
come predominantly from improvements in 
redistributive efficiency, while the gains in 
switching to poverty transfers come predomi-
nantly from improvements in targeting 
efficiency. Also, the gains from the latter reform 
are substantially higher than from the former 
reform. By combining both, the distributional 
power of the actual program, in terms of its 
ability to get a large percentage of the budget 
into the hands of those who need it the most, is a 
vast improvement on universal food subsidies. 
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